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Abstract. Fairness aware data mining aims to prevent algorithms from
discriminating against protected groups. The literature has come to an
impasse as to what constitutes explainable variability as opposed to
discrimination. This stems from incomplete discussions of fairness in
statistics. We demonstrate that fairness is achieved by ensuring impar-
tiality with respect to sensitive characteristics. As these characteristics
are determined outside of the model, the correct description of the
statistical task is to ensure impartiality. We provide a framework for
impartiality by accounting for different perspectives on the data gener-
ating process. This framework yields a set of impartial estimates that
are applicable in a wide variety of situations and post-processing tools
to correct estimates from arbitrary models. This effectively separates
prediction and fairness goals, allowing modelers to focus on generat-
ing highly predictive models without incorporating the constraint of
fairness.
MSC 2010 subject classifications: Primary 62P25, ; secondary 62J05.
Key words and phrases: Fairness-Aware Data Mining, Multiple Regres-
sion.
1. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has been a boon for improved decision making. The increased
volume and variety of data has opened the door to a host of data mining tools for
knowledge discovery; however, automated decision making using vast quantities of
data needs to be tempered by caution. In 2014, President Obama called for a 90-
day review of big data analytics. The review, “Big Data: Seizing Opportunities,
Preserving Values,” concludes that big data analytics can cause societal harm
by perpetuating the disenfranchisement of marginalized groups (House, 2014).
Fairness aware data mining (FADM) aims to address this concern.
Broadly speaking, the goal of this project is to allow increasingly complex
methods to be used without fear of infringing upon individuals’ rights. This will
be beneficial in all domains that have the potential for discrimination on the
basis on data. Applications abound in both the private sector and academics.
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Companies will be able to justify the use of partially automated decision making
in areas as diverse as loan applications, employment, and college admissions.
There will be clear fairness criteria to guide the construction of fair models, thus
reducing unintentional discrimination and litigation. A proper understanding of
fairness will inform regulatory agencies and policy makers such that they can
promote fairness and understand its statistical implications. In legal disputes, a
set of models of fairness provides a baseline from which detrimental impact can
be assessed.
A simple example clarifies the issue of fairness. Consider a bank that wants
to estimate the risk in giving an applicant a loan. The applicant has “legitimate
covariates” such as education and credit history, that can be used to determine
their risk. They also have “sensitive” or “protected” covariates such as race and
gender. Lastly, we introduce a third covariate group of “suspect” or “potentially
discriminatory” covariates. The canonical example of a suspect covariate is loca-
tion information such as the applicant’s address. While location is not a protected
characteristic such as race, it is often barred from use given the ability to dis-
criminate using it. In order to determine the interest rate of the loan, the bank
uses historical data to estimate the credit worthiness of the candidate. FADM
asks whether or not the estimates the bank constructs are fair. This is different
than asking if the data are fair or if the historical practice of giving loans was
fair. It is a question pertaining to the estimates produced by the bank’s model.
This generates several questions. First, what does fairness even mean for this sta-
tistical model? Second, what should the role of the sensitive covariates be in this
estimate? Third, how do legitimate and suspect covariates differ? Lastly, how do
we constrain the use of the sensitive covariates in black-box algorithms?
Our contributions fall into two main categories: conceptual and algorithmic.
First, we provide a statistical theory of fairness which revolves around impar-
tiality. The literature lacks a serious discussion of the philosophical components
of fairness and how they should be operationalized in statistics. Doing so will
require a spectrum of models to be defined, because fairness is a complicated
philosophical topic. We address these complications by introducing and demon-
strating the importance of the suspect covariate group. Second, after providing
this framework, it will be clear how to both construct fair estimates using simple
procedures as well as correct black-box estimates to achieve fairness.
It is important to note that these corrections can only be made by using all
of the data, including the sensitive covariates. This is intuitively clear because
guaranteeing that discrimination has not occurred requires checking the estimates
using sensitive characteristics. Having a spectrum of models of fairness also yields
two practical applications. First, we can quantify the cost of government programs
by considering the different incentives between a profit-maximizing firm and a
government-owned one that is constrained to be fair. Second, we can quantify
the cost of discrimination, which is an important component of litigation.
The main body of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives notation
and defines impartial predictions. Section 3 provides a brief philosophical and
legal background of fairness and is motivated by a long history of literature in
ethics and political philosophy. Section 4 constructively generates fair estimates
using multiple regression. We also compare estimates on an individual level in
Section 4.5. The literature lacks such a comparison even though it is crucially im-
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portant when arguing estimates are fair. Often social discussions revolve around
an individual being treated (un)fairly due to their membership in a protected
group. Section 5 uses the methods generated in Section 4 to correct estimates
from black-box models to achieve fairness. In light of Section 4, this is a straight-
forward task. We also test our methods on a data example to not only elucidate
the conceptual difficulties in the literature, but also to demonstrate that our
method achieves superior results.
A few remarks need to be made about the sensitive nature of the topic at hand.
These closely follow Holland (2003), and interested readers are referred there.
Sensitive covariates such as race and gender are not neutral concepts. It is the
plight of the data analyst that these categories are taken as given. We assume that
data are provided in which someone else has determined group membership. Our
questions are about the types of protection that can be offered given such a data
set. Furthermore, this project is descriptive, not normative. Our goal is to provide
data-generating models that elucidate philosophical nuances. Each scenario gives
rise to a different fair estimate; however, determining which scenario is accurate
is outside of the scope of this project.
2. DEFINING IMPARTIAL ESTIMATES
To motivate our definition of impartial predictive modeling, we consider a cou-
ple of suggestions which are incorrect. Our goal is to provide impartial estimates
of credit risk Y , given legitimate covariates x, sensitive covariates s, and suspect
covariates w. These are connected through an unknown, joint probability distri-
bution P(Y,x, s,w). Our data consists of n iid draws from this joint distribution.
The standard statistical goal is to estimate the conditional expectation of Y given
the covariates:
Y = E[Y |x, s,w] + u
where u has mean zero and is uncorrelated with all functions of the covariates. Our
goal is to estimate a conditional expectation that is impartial with respect to the
sensitive covariates. Intuitively, impartiality requires that the sensitive covariates
do not influence estimates. Through the following examples, we demonstrate the
need for a more refined definition of impartiality.
Impartial estimates are fair because the sensitive covariates are chosen to be
normatively relevant. In the FADM literature, the covariate groups are always
assumed to be provided. As such, the statistical task is disjoint from the normative
task of identifying covariate groups. This is why FADM techniques can be used in
domains such as batch effect analysis as discussed in Calders et al. (2013). When
analyzing batch effects, the covariate on which impartiality is desired is merely
batch membership.
For the remainder of the paper, we will use the term “impartial” to describe
the statistical goal. This is done in order to separate our task from normative
complications. That being said, the different covariate groups have normative
significance and need to be differentiated. Therefore, when referring to covariate
groups and during the background discussion of Section 3 we use the normative
language of fairness.
The first conjecture for impartial estimates can be described as “impartiality
as indifference.” That is, estimates are impartial if changing the value of the
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Fig 1: A 1933 map of Birmingham, Alabama marking high and low-risk areas
(FHLBB, 1935).
sensitive covariate does not change the estimate. We overload the notation Yˆ to
be both the estimated credit risk as well as a function that outputs the credit
risk given covariates; namely: Yˆ = Yˆ (x, s,w).
Definition 1 (Indifference). An estimate Yˆ (x, s,w) is indifferent to s if,
given two groups of s, s+ and s−,
Yˆ (x, s+,w) = Yˆ (x, s−,w).
There are two problems with this. First, it doesn’t allow for affirmative ac-
tion, which many believe is necessary to be impartial or fair. Our proposal easily
accounts for affirmative action policies and clearly indicates the assumptions nec-
essary for their validity. This is done by drawing distinctions between legitimate
and suspect covariates, which is motivated in Section 3. Second, indifferent es-
timates can be accomplished just by removing the sensitive covariates prior to
model fitting. Multiple authors have raised doubts that the legal requirement of
removing race prior to fitting a model is sufficient to achieve fairness (Kamishima
et al., 2012; Kamiran et al., 2013). Due to the relationships between race and
other covariates, merely removing race can leave lingering discriminatory effects
that permeate the data and potentially perpetuate discrimination. The use of
covariates associated with s to discriminate is called redlining.
The term “redlining” originated in the United States to describe maps that
were color-coded to represent areas in which banks would not invest. Figure 1
shows one such map from Birmingham, Alabama in the 1930s. It is marked in
different colors to indicate the riskiness of neighborhoods. For example, red in-
dicates hazardous areas and blue indicates good areas for investment. Denying
lending to hazardous areas appears facially neutral because it is race blind: the
bank need not consider racial information when determining whether to provide a
loan. These practices, however, primarily denied loans to black, inner-city neigh-
borhoods. This was used as a way to discriminate against such borrowers without
needing to observe race. This clearly demonstrates that merely excluding sensi-
tive information does not remove the possibility for discrimination. Conceptually,
the core issue is the misuse of available information.
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To avoid redlining, previous authors have proposed measures of group discrim-
ination which need to be reduced to zero. For example, if s+ and s− represent
two sets of sensitive covariates, the CV-discrimination score (Calders and Verwer,
2010) is
DS = E[Yˆ |s+]− En[Yˆ |s−].
This methodology is flawed, however, because it presupposes the solution to
challenging problems in casual inference. First, defining discrimination in this
way implicitly treats s as a causal variable. While different protected groups
can clearly have different experiences and outcomes, treating s as a casual vari-
able is fraught with difficulties (Holland, 2003). Furthermore, the discrimination
score ignores the role of other explanatory variables. In particular, some differ-
ences in expected credit worthiness may be explained by legitimate covariates.
Such explainable variation needs to be separated from discrimination. Subse-
quent research has attempted to disentangle explainable variation between sensi-
tive groups and discrimination. This is done either through naive-Bayes models
(Calders and Verwer, 2010) or crude propensity score stratification (Calders et al.,
2013). As we will introduce in Section 3 and demonstrate in Section 4, these dis-
cussions are incomplete and conflate two different effects.
For simplicity, we define impartiality with respect to the linear projection of
Y on to a set of covariates v:
Y = L(Y |v) + u,
where the error term u satisfies
E[u] = 0, Cov(v, u) = 0.
This allows core ideas to be fully explained in a familiar framework. The im-
portant steps of the process, however, can be accomplished with more robust
modeling techniques. We are currently working on a paper to explain the impli-
cations of doing so.
Definition 2 (Impartial Estimates and Impartiality Score). An estimate of
Y, Yˆ , is impartial if its residual, uˆ = Y − Yˆ , and linear projection on x, L(Yˆ |x),
satisfy
Var(uˆ)−1/2E[uˆ] = Cor(uˆ, s)Cor(s)−1diag(Var(s))−1/2E[s] (1)
Cor(uˆ,x) = Cor(uˆ, s)Cor(s)−1Cor(s,x) (2)
Cor(uˆ,w) = Cor(uˆ, s)Cor(s)−1Cor(s,w) (3)
Cor[η, s] = 0 where (4)
η = Yˆ − L(Yˆ |x),
We define the Impartiality Score (IS) as the sum of the absolute differences be-
tween the left and right hand sides of equations (1 - 4), normalized by the total
number of covariates. Our models center s, in which case 0 ≤ IS ≤ 1.
While our definition uses linear projections, estimates are not required to be
linear. We use this fact in Section 5 to correct “black box” estimates created
from a random forest. Similarly, the covariates s, x, and w need not only include
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main effects. Interactions within groups as well as between groups are possible.
It is only important to treat the resulting interactions as covariates of the ap-
propriate type. Interactions within a covariate group will be of that group, while
interactions with suspect variables will be considered suspect and interactions be-
tween sensitive and legitimate covariates are considered legitimate. This follows
from the interpretations of suspect and legitimate covariates that are provided in
Section 4.
Furthermore, the conditions in Definition 2 do not uniquely specify the estimate
Yˆ . For example, consider adding independent, mean-zero noise to Yˆ . This merely
degrades the performance of the estimate. The estimates are still impartial since
the noise is independent of the sensitive attributes s.
The criteria in Definition 2 are identified via impartial estimates constructed in
Section 4. In the simplest case that has only legitimate and sensitive covariates,
coefficients are estimated in the full regression model but predictions are made
using only legitimate covariates. Explanatory covariates are centered such that
removing the sensitive covariates during prediction does not change the estimated
mean. The reverse regression literature in economics uses these estimates as a
preprocessing step (Goldberger, 1984). That literature did not justify this as a
fair estimate. We do so here and extend the estimates to more philosophically
robust settings . Suspect covariates require an additional preprocessing step to
ensure impartiality.
Identifying impartial estimates and fairness constructively has both philosoph-
ical and empirical support. The philosopher John Rawls discusses fair institutions
as the method of achieving fairness (Wenar, 2013). Similarly, Brockner (2006) ex-
plains the importance of process fairness as opposed to merely outcome fairness.
Process fairness focuses on how people are treated throughout the process of a
decision whereas outcome fairness focuses on the results of the decision. The au-
thors identify several examples in which firms attempt to layoff workers in a fair
manner. Workers often feel that the decisions are fair when they are consulted
frequently and the process is transparent, even if their severance packages are far
worse. This points out the importance of fair treatment as fair use of information,
not merely a measure of the outcome. This is discussed in the following section.
3. BACKGROUND
Fairness is a vague term and is used broadly; however, it is closely related to
equality. This connection provides a rigorous way to discuss fairness. Colloquially,
fairness requires that “similar people are treated similarly.” This mirrors propor-
tional equality, which is one of several principles of equality. “A form of treatment
of others or distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all rele-
vant persons in relation to their due” (Gosepath, 2011). This includes the concept
of merit as well as a need to specify a metric for similarity between people and
the relationship between merit and outcome. “Merit” here merely means a value
which is relevant to the decision at hand. For example, when discussing salary,
merit is productivity for a given job. Alternatively, when discussing loans, merit
is the riskiness of the borrower. In this paper, estimates are truly proportionally
equal because we focus on linear models; however, different models may yield
estimates of merit which predict outcomes better. This is left for future work.
The classic alternative to proportional equality is strict equality or equality of
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outcome. Strict equality makes the perhaps trivial claim that if two things are
equal in the relevant respects then they should be treated equally. The issue, of
course, is determining what criteria are relevant and how to measure similarity.
In some cases, merit is irrelevant and strict equality is desired, such as with civil
liberties and basic rights.
FADM addresses areas of justified unequal treatment. In the loan application
example, people can receive different interest rates, but the manner in which the
estimates differ needs to be controlled. Other considerations that are commonly
thought to belong to this group include: “need or differing natural disadvantages
(e.g. disabilities); existing rights or claims (e.g. private property); differences in
the performance of special services (e.g. desert, efforts, or sacrifices); efficiency;
and compensation for direct and indirect or structural discrimination (e.g. affir-
mative action)” (Gosepath, 2011).
FADM assumes that a list of sensitive characteristics is provided and is mo-
tivated by the requirement that sensitive covariates are not relevant measures
of similarity in many applications. We will refer to the latter as the fairness
assumption:
Definition 3 (Fairness Assumption). Sensitive covariates are not or ought
not be a relevant source of variability or merit.
Achieving fairness requires sensitive characteristics to not influence the out-
come. Due to the possibility of redlining, removing sensitive covariates is insuf-
ficient. In order to be more precise, we argue that decisions should be impartial
with respect to the protected covariates. Impartiality is easiest to characterize in
a negative manner: “an impartial choice is simply one in which a certain sort of
consideration (i.e. some property of the individuals being chosen between) has no
influence” (Jollimore, 2014).
The need to ignore sensitive information while acknowledging merit differences
is addressed by the literature in equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity
is widely appealed to in both legal and philosophical communities as well as being
“the frequently vague minimal formula at work in every egalitarian conception
of distributive justice” (Gosepath, 2011). Furthermore, the examples that FADM
is commonly concerned with are about opportunity, not merely distribution of
goods. For example, the opportunity for a home loan or the opportunity to attend
university. Equality of opportunity provides a spectrum of restrictions that are
concrete enough to be translated into statistical models. Therefore, this is the
measure of equality that we will use.
The philosophical literature on equality of opportunity analyses the way in
which benefits are allocated in society (Arneson, 2015). A benefit can be anything
from a home loan or high salary to college admission and political office. One
way of understanding equality of opportunity is formal equality of opportunity
(FEO), which requires an open-application for benefits (anyone can apply) and
that benefits are given to those of highest merit. Merit will of course be measured
differently depending on the scenario or benefit in question.Therefore, the most
productive employee receives a high salary, while the least-risky borrower receives
a low interest rate loan. There is cause for concern if discrimination exists in either
the ability of some individuals to apply for the benefit or in the analysis of merit.
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The fairness assumption is that sensitive covariates are not relevant criteria by
which to judge merit.
Substantive equality of opportunity (SEO) contains the same strictures as
above, but is satisfied only if everyone has a genuine opportunity to be of high
merit. In particular, suppose there are social restrictions or benefits that only
allow one group to be of high merit. For clarity, consider a rigid caste system,
where only the upper caste has the time and financial resources to educate and
train their children. Only children born to upper-caste parents will be of high
quality and receive future benefits. This can be true even when lower-caste indi-
viduals can apply for the benefits and benefits are given based on merit. In this
case, proponents of SEO claim that true equality of opportunity has not been
achieved. While many countries lack a caste system, some may argue that cycles
of poverty and wealth lead to a similar regress in the reasons for the disparity
between protected groups, for example.
The difference between FEO and SEO that is relevant to FADM is whether
there is benign or prejudicial association between covariates. This lies at the heart
of not only legal cases, affirmative action, and social science literature, but also
the public debates about fair treatment. The benign association model assumes
the relationship between the sensitive covariates s and legitimate covariates x
is not due to social constraints. In fact, this is why they can be called legiti-
mate. Suppose differences between groups are the result of different motivation
via familial socialization. For example, if some communities impart a higher value
of education to their children than others, the conditional distributions for ed-
ucational attainment may be significantly different. These differences, however,
appear legitimate. Rejecting this claim in favor of ignoring such merit differences
raises questions about whether parents’ rights to raise their children take priority
over strict adherence to equal treatment among groups (Arneson, 2015; Brighouse
and Swift, 2009).
Alternatively, suppose the relationship between sensitive covariates s and sus-
pect covariates w is the result of either social restrictions or social benefits. This
prejudicial association is why the covariates may be called suspect. For example,
one group could be historically denied admission to university due to their group
membership. This can produce similar observable differences between covariate
distributions, in that the favored group has higher educational attainment than
the disfavored group.
In FADM, these two cases need to be treated differently; however, determining
whether a covariate is legitimate or suspect is in the domain of causal inference,
social science, and ethics. Our interest is not in specifying which variables have
benign versus prejudicial association, but in constructing impartial estimates once
such a determination has been made. As we will see in the simple example of
Section 4.5, we must consider the type of association between covariates in order
to justify impartial estimates used in FADM. The literature lacks a discussion of
these differences, leaving all previous estimates unjustified.
Data sets may differ in terms of which covariates are prejudicially associated
with sensitive attributes. To continue the education example, compare and con-
trast the education systems in Finland and the United States. The Finnish system
is predicated on equal educational opportunities instead of the quality of educa-
tion (Sahlberg and Hargreaves, 2011). Regardless of the community in which
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students are raised, there is a reasonable expectation that they are provided the
same access to education. In the United States, however, there are large differ-
ences in school quality. This may require education to be treated differently if
one desires fair estimates in Finnish data or United States data.
Many of the relevant distinctions between formal and substantive equality of
opportunity are mirrored in the US civil rights tradition by the principles of
anti-classification and anti-subordination, respectively. The anti-classification or
anti-differentiation principle states that “the government may not classify people
either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis” of a sensitive covariate (Balkin
and Siegel, 2003). Anti-subordination conceived under the “group disadvantaging
principle”, on the other hand, contents that laws should not perpetuate “the
subordinate status of a specially disadvantaged group” (Fiss, 1976). Both legal
theories constrain the use of sensitive covariates, and we formally provide the
distinctions between their effects in this paper.
In the United States, legal cases on equality are based on two theories of
discrimination outlined under Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act. Disparate
treatment is direct discrimination on the basis of a protected trait. It requires jus-
tification of the intent to discriminate based on the protected trait. An easy solu-
tion to prevent disparate treatment is merely to hide the information. Kamishima
et al. (2012) termed this direct prejudice, providing the mathematical definition
of its presence as conditional dependence of the response and sensitive covariates
given the legitimate covariates.
Disparate impact is discrimination on the basis of another covariate which
disproportionately effects a protected class. Under this tenet, a policy is not dis-
criminatory by definition (in that it does not codify treating groups differently)
but is discriminatory in practice. Kamishima et al. (2012) called this indirect
prejudice, but incorrectly defined its presence as dependence of the response and
sensitive covariates. Defining disparate impact requires a more refined notion
of impartiality, one that is able to capture the distinction between explainable
variability and discrimination. While initially introduced to govern employment,
disparate treatment and disparate impact have been expanded to other domains.
These concepts also govern legal cases in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand,
though by other names such as “discrimination by subterfuge” or “indirect dis-
crimination.”
The canonical example of disparate impact is redlining. A bank may treat all in-
dividuals equally within each neighborhood; however, by deciding to build offices
and provide loans in only select regions, lending practices may be discriminatory.
While race is irrelevant in the statement of the policy, the racial homogeneity of
many neighborhoods reveals this practice to be potentially discriminatory. The fa-
mous Schelling segregation models demonstrate that such homogeneity can arise
even without the presence of strong preferences for being around members of a
particular group (Schelling, 1971). While redlining occurs increasingly less often,
two large cases were settled in Wisconsin and New Jersey in 2015. In Section 4.5,
we provide a detailed numerical example that demonstrates redlining and our
solution.
The FADM problem is fundamentally about what constitutes explainable vari-
ation. That is, what differences between groups are explainable due to legitimate
covariates, and what differences are due to discrimination. More precisely, there
imsart-sts ver. 2014/10/16 file: impartial.tex date: October 7, 2016
10 K. JOHNSON ET AL.
are important distinctions between statistical discrimination and redlining. Sta-
tistical discrimination is defined as a sufficiently accurate generalization. In many
ways, this is the statistical enterprise. For example, it is a sufficiently accurate
generalization that individuals with good repayment history are more likely to
repay future loans. Therefore, such applicants are considered to be of lower risk
and receive lower interest rates. The Equal Credit Opportunity Acts of 1974 and
the amendments in 1975 and 1976 allow such “discrimination” if it is “empirically
derived and statistically valid.” It is clear that “discrimination” in this case refers
to distinguishing good and bad risks.
Statistical discrimination is contrasted with redlining, which is a negative con-
sequence of the ability to estimate sensitive covariates using legitimate ones.
This can be used to discriminate against a protected group without having to see
group membership. In this case, “discrimination” is used to describe prejudicial
treatment. While often clear from context, in the interest of avoiding confusion
between a legitimate type of statistical discrimination and redlining, “discrimi-
nation” will be used in a normative, prejudicial sense. The exception is in the
phrase “statistical discrimination,” in which case we will be more precise. This
will separate the normative and statistical uses of the term “discrimination.”
The distinction between legal and illegal forms of statistical discrimination pri-
marily arises due to which covariates are being used to make generalizations. The
concept of a sensitive or protected characteristic prohibits its use for generaliza-
tions. For example, in the United States incarceration and race are associated:
black males are significantly more likely to have been imprisoned at some point
in their lives than white males. Actions based on such heuristics are often illegal,
though they may be economically rational. Risse and Zeckhauser (2004) provide
a richer account of these cases, addressing concerns surrounding racial profiling.
They separate the notion of statistical discrimination from the larger setting of
societal discrimination. The debate often centers on what is a “disproportionate”
use of sensitive information (Banks, 2001). Both legitimate and suspect covari-
ates may be used for redlining, as the only requirement is that they are correlated
with the sensitive attributes. We identify and remove these redlining effects in
the following section.
4. MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF IMPARTIALITY
With the above discussion in hand, we can place our work in context of the
literature on FADM and discrimination. Afterward, we provide a detailed account
of statistical discrimination and redlining.
4.1 Related Work
Other authors have offered answers to various aspects of the FADM problem.
The first branch of research focused on how to perform fair classification while
respecting group fairness criteria such as the discrimination score. This can be
accomplished by penalizing discrimination during estimation (Calders and Ver-
wer, 2010; Calders et al., 2013; Kamishima et al., 2012), modifying the raw data
(Pedreschi et al., 2008; Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer, 2013), or modifying objective
functions with fairness criteria (Kamiran et al., 2010; Zemel et al., 2013). This
literature must separate explainable variability from discrimination (Kamiran
et al., 2013). We improve upon their discussions by providing a simple, tractable
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formulation of impartiality that addresses issues often encountered in real data.
A second branch of research analyses fairness through the related subject of
differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2011). In the language of the current paper, the
authors assume that fair estimates of merit are provided and the decision maker
must use them to map individuals to randomized decision rules. A similar defini-
tion of fairness in multi-armed bandits is offered by (Joseph et al., 2016), in which
a decision maker is not allowed to give preferential treatment between groups un-
til one group is known to be of higher merit than another. While this places a
constraint on the learning process, the end result only satisfies FEO without in-
corporating legal constraints, thus failing to capture fairness in a philosophically
robust way. Furthermore, depending on how merit is estimated, redlining can still
occur.
There is a long history of work in economics on discrimination. A summary is
provided in (Fan and Moro, 2011), and the literature can be understood as provid-
ing explanations for the presence of discrimination even when FEO is satisfied. It
is interesting to note that the data case we consider that allows observable differ-
ences in merit between groups is regarded as the trivial case and lacks significant
research (Phelps, 1972). Like Joseph et al. (2016), it is assumed that firms can
acknowledge merit differences without addressing SEO. Most of the literature fo-
cuses on the existence of discrimination in market equilibrium without underlying
differences in merit between protected groups (Arrow, 1973; Foster and Vohra,
1992; Coate and Loury, 1993).
4.2 Model Framework
Fairness in modeling will be explained via directed acyclic graphs (DAGs),
which are also referred to as Bayesian or Gaussian networks or path diagrams.
DAGs will be used to conveniently represent conditional independence assump-
tions. While often used as a model to measure causal effects, we are explicitly not
using them for this purpose. As previously stated, our goal is to create impar-
tial estimates, whereas the estimation of a causal effect would attempt to answer
whether the historical data are fair.
As such, we do not require the same type of causal interpretation. This stems
from a different object of interest: in causal modeling, one cares about a casual
parameter or direct effect of the covariate of interest whereas in FADM we care
about the estimates produced by the model. Estimating a causal effect requires
considering counterfactuals. For example, estimating a treatment effect of a drug
requires a comparison of a patient’s outcome under both treatment and control,
even though only one of these outcomes is observed.
As FADM is concerned with estimates from models as opposed to outcomes,
counterfactuals are easily computed. This is trivial to accomplish because it only
requires producing an estimate for a modified observation. We need not consider
the performance of an individual with that set of covariates (or even if it exists).
Therefore, we do not need recourse to the interventionist or causal components
of standard causal models and can deal only with their predictive components. In
short, we only use DAGs to represents the conditional independence assumptions
made between variables.
Figure 2 provides an example DAG representing a possible set of variables
and relationships in a simplified college admissions process. The variables are
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Tutor
SAT
Admit
IQ
Fig 2: Example Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
Tutor, SAT Score, IQ, and Admit. These indicate a student’s standardized test
score (SAT), intelligence quotient (IQ), whether they received SAT tutoring, and
whether they were admitted to a given university. In the graph, the variables
are called nodes and are connected via directed edges. This direction captures
a causal relationship: the value of Tutor causally relates to the value of SAT
score. Dashed edged indicate a latent common cause: an unobserved variable U
that causally effects both nodes. We use DAGs to concisely represent conditional
independence assumptions. In the language of DAGs, two nodes are called “d-
separated” by a set of nodes B if all of the paths (series of edges, regardless of
direction) connecting the two nodes are “blocked” by a collection of nodes. The
only criterion for blocked paths we will use is the following: a path is blocked by
a set of nodes B if it contains a chain i→ b→ j such that b is in B. If two nodes
are d-separated given B, then the nodes are conditionally independent given B.
For example, Tutor and Admit are d-separated (conditionally independent) given
SAT and IQ. For further information on DAGs, see Pearl (2009).
The rest of this section introduces impartial estimates in stages via models
in which the fairness assumption is tractable. These models correspond to for-
mal interpretations of what particular notions of equality of opportunity require.
We begin by enforcing FEO, which only uses sensitive and legitimate covariates.
The goal in FEO is to have a best estimate of merit while satisfying the legal
requirements of disparate treatment and disparate impact. Second, we consider
a full SEO model (F-SEO), in which there are no legitimate covariates, only sen-
sitive and suspect covariates. This model captures the philosopher John Rawl’s
theory of fair equality of opportunity. Subsection 4.5 provides a toy example to
demonstrate the effect of considering covariates as either legitimate or suspect.
The complete data case with sensitive, legitimate, and suspect covariates is con-
sidered in subsection 4.6. Lastly, subsection 4.7 discusses ways to use impartial
estimates to estimate the cost of discrimination.
4.3 FEO
FEO is not concerned with potentially discriminatory covariates. Consider an
idealized population model that includes all possible covariates. For the i’th in-
dividual, Yi is credit risk, si contains the sensitive attributes (race, gender, age,
etc), xo,i contains the observed, legitimate covariates, and xu,i contains the unob-
served, legitimate covariates. Covariates si, xo,i, and xu,i are all bold to indicate
they are column vectors, and this convention will be used throughout the pa-
per. Unobserved covariates could be potentially observable such as drug use, or
unknowable such as future income during the term of the loan. The data are
assumed to have a joint distribution P(Y, s,xo,xu), from which n observations
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Fig 3: Observationally Equivalent Data Generating Models. No restrictions are
placed on the dependence structure within the vectors xo, xu, and s.
are drawn. The fairness assumption requires that s is not relevant to credit risk
given full information:
P(Y |s,xo,xu) = P(Y |xo,xu).
It is important to posit the existence of both observed and unobserved legitimate
covariates to capture the often observed relationship between sensitive covariates
and the response. Specifically, observed data often show
P(Y |s,xo) 6= P(Y |xo).
This lack of conditional independence violates the fairness assumption that sen-
sitive features are uninformative.
Since assumptions like these will need to be presented many times, they will
be succinctly captured using DAGs such as Figure 3. Observed data are often
only representable by a fully connected graph which contains no conditional in-
dependence properties (Figure 3a). This observed distribution can be generated
from multiple full-information models. The first possible representation of the
full data is an unrestricted model (Figure 3b). In this case, sensitive covariates
are not conditionally independent of the response given full information. Such
a model states that there are different risk properties between protected groups
even after considering full information. The fairness assumption is captured in
Figure 3c: Y is d-separated from s given xu and xo. Stated differently, credit risk
is conditionally independent of the sensitive covariates given full information. Un-
der this full-information model, the apparent importance of sensitive information
in the observed data is only due to unobserved covariates.
Creating impartial estimates is challenging because it requires estimating Y
under an assumption that does not hold in the data; however, the unrestricted
model in Figure 3b is equivalent to the fair model in Figure 3c if the direct effect
of s on Y is zero. This provides insight into the manner in which the impartial
estimate of Y will be constructed: impartiality requires constraining the sensitive
covariates to have “no-direct-effect” on the estimates.
For clarity, this will be described using linear regression models of credit risk.
While a general functional form may be preferred, understanding impartiality in
linear models provides not only a tractable solution but also insight into how to
ensure impartiality in the general case. The insight is gained through properly
understanding standard effect decompositions. Non-standard, but conceptually
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identical decompositions also yield novel connections to both legal and philo-
sophical standards for fairness.
Compare the classical full and restricted regression models. The full regression
model includes both the sensitive and legitimate covariates as explanatory vari-
ables, while the restricted or marginal regression model only includes legitimate
covariates as explanatory variables. Coefficients estimated in these models are
given subscripts f and r, respectively. In both cases, and for the rest of the mod-
els considered in this paper, model has mean 0. While the notation is similar to
that of multiple and simple regression models, respectively, covariates are poten-
tially vector valued. Since this distinction is clear, we still use the terminology of
partial and marginal coefficients for the full and restricted models, respectively.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, all estimated coefficients will be given
“hats” and double subscripts to indicate the covariate and model to which they
belong (e.g. βˆ0,f ). Since no parameters are ever given for xu, the parameters for
xo will be written βx,model to improve readability.
Full Regression Restricted Regression
Model Y = β0,f + β
>
s,fs+ β
>
x,fxo + f Y = β0,r + β
>
x,rxo + r
A standard decomposition demonstrates that the estimated marginal coeffi-
cient βˆx,r can be represented as a function of the estimated partial coefficients
βˆx,f and βˆs,f (Stine and Foster, 2013). This separates the marginal coefficient
into direct and indirect effects:
βˆx,r︸︷︷︸
marginal
= βˆx,f︸︷︷︸
direct
+ Λˆxβˆs,f︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect
. (5)
where Λˆx is estimated from the intermediate regression
s = λ0 + Λ
>
x xo + s.
As alluded to previously, βˆs,f = 0 is ideal. In this case, estimates are unchanged
by excluding s during model fitting. In general, the same effect can be accom-
plished by fitting the full regression model to compute coefficient estimates, but
making predictions that only use βˆ0,f and βˆx,f . This removes the influence of s
as desired by impartiality. While only legitimate covariates are used, coefficients
must be estimated in the full model, else the relationship between sensitive and
legitimate covariates allows discriminatory effects to be included in the coefficient
of xo. The estimates are impartial under FEO since we are not addressing the
possibility of discrimination in xo. The reverse regression literature in economics
uses these estimates as a preprocessing step (Goldberger, 1984). That literature
did not justify this as a fair estimate. We do so here and extend the estimates to
more philosophically robust settings.
Definition 4 (Impartial Estimate: Formal Equality of Opportunity). Using
a linear regression model, Yˆ is impartial if:
Yˆ = βˆ0,f + βˆ
>
x,fxo,
where the coefficients are estimated in the model
Y = β0,f + β
>
s,fs+ β
>
x,fxo + f .
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The standard decomposition in equation (5) can be presented in a non-standard
way to yield additional insight. Collect the observations into matrices Y, S, and
X and consider writing the estimated response from the full regression. By de-
composing this expression we can identify components which are of philosophical
and legal interest. Separate the sensitive covariates into the component which is
orthogonal to the legitimate covariates and that which is correlated with them.
We will refer to these as the “unique” and “shared” components, respectively.
It is important to note that the coefficient is computed only from the unique
component, which follows from writing the multiple regression coefficient as the
solution to a simple regression problem (Hastie et al., 2009). This decomposition
can be done by considering the projection matrix on the column space of Xo. For
a full-rank matrix M, the projection or hat matrix is HM = M(M
′M)−1M′.
Yˆ = βˆ0,f + Sβˆs,f +Xoβˆx,f
Yˆ = βˆ0,f +
︷ ︸︸ ︷
HXoS︸ ︷︷ ︸
di
βˆs,f + (I−HXo)S︸ ︷︷ ︸
dt
βˆs,f +Xoβˆx,f (6)
The resulting terms are identified in equation (6) as di and dt, to indicate their
legal significance. The term dt captures the disparate treatment effect: it is the
component of the estimate which is due to the unique variability of S. Given the
fair model in Figure 3c, we know the apparent importance of S (signified by the
magnitude of βˆs,f ) is due to excluded covariates; however, it is identified by S
in the observed data. While this may be a “sufficiently accurate generalization,”
in that the coefficient may be statistically significant for example, this is illegal
statistical discrimination. The term “statistical discrimination” is commonly used
in social science to refer to these cases where sensitive covariates are used to
estimate unobserved but possibly economically relevant characteristics (Blank
et al., 2004).
The term di captures the disparate impact effect. We refer to it as the in-
formative redlining effect in order to contrast it with an effect identified later.
Intuitively, it is the misuse of a legitimately informative variable and is the result
of the ability to estimate S with other covariates. It is an adjustment to the in-
fluence of Xo that accounts for different performance between groups of S. It is
important that the adjustment is identified by variability in S instead of Xo, as
seen in equation (5). Identifying a disparate impact effect may be challenging be-
cause it is in the space spanned by the legitimate covariate, Xo. The current legal
solution merely removes the sensitive features from the analysis which allows for
redlining via the term dt.
4.4 Full SEO
One objection to this model is the assumption that all x covariates are legiti-
mate. Thus, while credit risk may be explained in terms of x without recourse to
s, that is only because the covariates x are the result of structural discrimination.
This critique stems from concerns over SEO: different s groups may not have the
same possibility of being of high merit as measured by x. If this is driven by
societal constraints such as a class hierarchy or a cycle of poverty, these covari-
ates may be suspect, and their use could perpetuate the disenfranchisement of
historically marginalized groups. Such seemingly legitimate variables which are
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prejudicially associated with sensitive covariates need to be considered differently,
as they are simultaneously potentially informative and discriminatory. This class
of “potentially illegitimate” or “suspect” covariates can be used to estimate merit,
but only in such a way that does not distinguish between groups in s.
Fairness requires average group differences to be removed because averages
differ due to discrimination. Other papers have advocated a regression approach
where all variables are considered suspect variables (Calders et al., 2013). Without
a proper understanding of the implications of this viewpoint, however, the results
are highly unsatisfactory. This will be discussed in detail via example in Section
4.5.
Ideally, one would prefer to estimate the causal effect of the sensitive covariates
such that the effect can be removed. A conservative assumption mirrors the fair-
ness assumption for sensitive covariates: suspect covariates are assumed to have
no direct effect on the outcome in the full information model. As such, they are
merely used as proxy variables for missing information.
Proxy variables, also known as information carriers, do not directly influence Y
given full information. While this is a similar property as s, they are not consid-
ered to be protected characteristics. A common example of a suspect covariate or
an information carrier is location. Living in a particular location does not make
someone of higher merit for many applications, but it may be indicative of things
that do so. For example, suppose that information on education is missing in the
data set. Location can be used as a proxy for education. This, however, may be
concerning given that most neighborhoods are racially homogeneous. Impartial
estimation in this setting should allow location to be a proxy for a legitimate vari-
able but must not use location as a proxy for race or other sensitive covariates.
Given the difficulty of precisely separating these two components, conservative
estimates can be used to ensure that location is not used for redlining.
For simplicity, our current discussion excludes observed legitimate covariates
which are added in Section 4.6. The data are assumed to have a joint distribution
P(Y, s,xu,w), wherew is a vector of suspect covariates, from which n observations
are drawn. As before, consider a linear model of credit risk given the sensitive
and suspect covariates. The coefficients are given the subscript p for proxy, and
p has mean 0.
Full SEO Model: Y = β0,p + β
>
s,ps+ β
>
w,pw + p
DAGs similar to those in the previous subsection visually represent the fairness
assumption. In the observed data, s and w are often associated with Y . As
before, this observed data structure can be generated from multiple full data
models which include the unobserved, legitimate covariates. An unrestricted data
model, Figure 4b, posits no conditional independence between covariates. The
fair data model, Figure 4c, respects both constraints on s and w implied by the
fairness assumption. Furthermore, this captures the intuition of a proxy variable;
if location is a proxy for education and education is already in the model, then
location will be uninformative.
As before, decompose the estimates from the full SEO model, where W is
the matrix of proxy variables with w′i as rows. All explanatory variables are
separated into shared and unique components. In both decompositions, there
are components identified as disparate treatment and disparate impact. Further
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Fig 4: DAGs Using Suspect or Proxy Variables
information can be gained by considering the decompositions of W and X into
their constituent parts. There is a unique component, orthogonal to S, as well as
components labeled sd+ and sd−.
FEO: Yˆf = βˆ0,f + HXoS︸ ︷︷ ︸
di
βˆs,f + (I−HXo)S︸ ︷︷ ︸
dt
βˆs,f (7)
HSXo︸ ︷︷ ︸
sd+
βˆx,f + (I−HS)Xo︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
βˆx,f (8)
F-SEO: Yˆp = βˆ0,p + HWS︸ ︷︷ ︸
di
βˆs,p + (I−HW)S︸ ︷︷ ︸
dt
βˆs,p (9)
HSW︸ ︷︷ ︸
sd−
βˆw,p + (I−HS)W︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
βˆw,p (10)
In equations (7) and (8), previous discussions of redlining do not distinguish
between the terms di and sd+ (Kamishima et al., 2012; Kamiran et al., 2013)
because they are both due to the correlation between Xo and S. It is clear that
they are different, as HXoS is in the space spanned by Xo and HSXo is in the
space spanned by S. Furthermore, the coefficients attached to these terms are
estimated from different sources. Intuition may suggest we remove all components
in the space spanned by S, but this is often incorrect. The term sd+ can be
included in many models because it accounts for the group means of X. Excluding
sd+ implies that the level of X is not important but that an individual’s deviation
from their group mean is. This makes group membership a hindrance or advantage
and is inappropriate for a legitimate covariate. Therefore, sd+ should be included
if x is legitimate.
In the decomposition of the full SEO model, equation (10), sd− addresses the
concern that the group means are potentially unfair or could be used to discrim-
inate. For example, if w is location, sd− may measure racial differences between
neighborhoods. Given that proxy variables w are not considered directly infor-
mative, it is unclear what these differences can legitimately contribute. If there is
racial bias in neighborhood demographics, using this information would perpetu-
ate this discrimination. Ensuring that this does not occur requires removing sd−
from the estimates of Y. This identifies a new type of redlining effect that we
call uninformative redlining; it is the sum of di and sd−. Uninformative redlining
can be identified visually using the graphs in Figure 4. Fairness constrains the
information contained in the arrow s→ Y as well as information conveyed in the
path s→ w→ Y . This is because s→ w is potentially discriminatory. Therefore,
fair estimates with suspect or proxy variables only use the unique variability in
W. An important consequence of the F-SEO estimate is that average estimates
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are the same for different groups of s. This is an alternate construction of the
initial estimates used by Calders et al. (2013).
Definition 5 (Impartial Estimate: Full Substantive Equality of Opportunity).
Using a linear regression model, Yˆ is impartial if:
Yˆ = βˆ0,p + βˆ
>
w,p(w − Λˆ>s s),
where βˆ0,p and βˆw,p are estimated in the model
Y = β0,p + β
>
s,ps+ β
>
w,pw,
and Λˆs is the matrix of coefficients estimated in the model
w = λ0 + Λ
>
s s+ w.
The estimates in Definition 5 can also be constructed by first projecting w off
of s to create the unique component found in equation (10), and then treating
the result as a legitimate covariate in the FEO framework.
4.5 Simple Example: FEO vs SEO
This section provides a simplified example to compare the estimates implied by
FEO and SEO. Comparing estimates on an individual level has been overlooked in
the literature, which favors providing a mathematical statement of discrimination
for the set of predictions and demonstrating that the measure has been satisfied.
It is important to understand what the estimates themselves look like. Claims
about fairness are often made my individuals: the applicant in our loan example
wants to be treated fairly. We demonstrate how ignoring this is such a large
oversight of previous works. Without a proper generative story, “fair” estimates
can appear decidedly unfair.
Consider a simple example with only two covariates: education level, x, and
sensitive group, s. Covariate names are no longer in bold because they are not
vectors. Suppose the data is collected on individuals who took out a loan of a
given size. In this case, suppose higher education is indicative of better repayment.
As an additional simplification, suppose that education is split into only two
categories: high and low. Lastly, to see the relevant issues, s and x need to be
associated. The two sensitive groups will be written as s+ and s−, merely to
indicate which group, on average, has higher education. As such, the majority of
s− have low education and the majority of s+ have high education. The response
is the indicator of default, D.
The data and estimates are provided in Table 1, in which there exist direct
effects for both s and x. This is consistent with the observed data DAGs in pre-
vious sections. While the framework presented in this paper is equally applicable
to logistic regression and generalized linear models, this data example is simple
enough that linear regression produces accurate conditional probability estimates.
Therefore, different estimates can be directly analyzed for fairness.
Five possible estimates are compared in Table 1: the full OLS model, the
restricted regression which excludes s, the FEO model in which education is con-
sidered a legitimate covariate, the SEO model in which education is considered
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Table 1
Simplified Loan Repayment data.
Income (P(x)) Low (.6) High (.4)
Group (P(s|x)) s− (.75) s+ s− (.25) s+ Total
Default Yes 225 60 20 30 335
Default No 225 90 80 270 665
Pˆ(Di = 1|xi, si) DS RMSE
Full Model .5 .4 .2 .1 -.25 13.84
Exclude s .475 .475 .125 .125 -.17 13.91
FEO .455 .455 .155 .155 -.15 13.93
SEO .39 .535 .09 .235 0.00 14.37
Marginal .35 .35 .35 .35 0.00 14.93
a suspect covariate, and the marginal model which estimates the marginal prob-
ability of default without any covariates. Estimates are presented along with the
RMSE from estimating the true default indicator and the discrimination score
(DS) (Calders and Verwer, 2010). While we have argued that “discrimination
score” is a misnomer since it does not separate explainable from discriminatory
variation, it provides a useful perspective given its widespread use in the litera-
ture.
Since education is the only covariate that can measure similarity, the collo-
quial notion of fairness dictates that estimates should be constant for individuals
with the same education. This is easily accomplished by the legal prescription
of excluding s. If the information is not observed, it cannot lead to disparate
treatment directly related to group membership. The FEO model satisfies this
as well. As seen in the standard decomposition in equation (5) the only differ-
ence between the two estimates is the coefficient on x. Said differently, the term
di in equation (6) lies in the space spanned by x. Therefore its removal only
changes estimates for education groups. Excluding s permits redlining because it
increases the estimated disparity between low- and high-education groups. This
disproportionately effects those in s− as they constitute the majority of the low
education group. The FEO estimates result in some average differences between
groups, but this is acceptable if the association between x and s is benign. This
accurately measures the proportional differences desired by Banks (2001) for fair
treatment.
The SEO estimates appear counter-intuitive: although s+ performs better in
our data set even after accounting for education, these “fair” estimates predict
the opposite. Understanding this requires accepting the world view implicit in
the SEO estimates: average education differences between groups are the result
of structural differences in society. Members of s− in the high education group
have a much higher education than average for s−. Similarly, members of s+ who
are in the high education group have a higher education than average for s+, but
not by as much. The magnitude of these differences is given importance, not the
education level.
Broadly speaking, this type of correction for group differences occurs in uni-
versity admissions processes when students are compared regionally. Consider
the explanatory covariate to be “SAT score,” which is a standardized test score
commonly used in the United States to assess students’ readiness for university.
The sensitive covariate is the state from which the student is applying. Average
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SAT scores differ drastically between states, with the spread between the best
and worst performing states being over 17% (Zhang, 2016). This may be due, in-
part, to factors such as differences in education budgets, emphasis on high school
education, and focus on test preparation. Regional comparisons remove some of
these structural differences.
In our example, the SEO model balances the differences in education distri-
butions, resulting in both groups having the same average estimated default.
This is seen in the discrimination score of 0. Without claiming that education is
partially the result of structural differences, the SEO estimates appear to discrim-
inate against s+. All estimation methods previously considered in the literature
produce estimates relevantly similar to SEO in this regard. This was not acknowl-
edged because a direct comparison of the change in individual estimates was not
provided. Furthermore, if not all s+ individuals are given a benefit or not all s−
individuals are given a detriment, then these models are merely approximations
of the fair correction. An ideal protected or sensitive covariate s is exactly that
which accounts for differences in the opportunity of being high merit. This is
more in line with Rawl’s conception of equality of opportunity (Rawls, 2001),
but this line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper.
The SEO estimates show another important property: their RMSE is lower
than that of the marginal estimate of default while still minimizing the discrim-
ination score. As such, if a bank is required to minimize differences between
groups in the interest of fairness, it would rather use the SEO estimates than the
marginal estimate. The difference between the two estimates is that SEO still
acknowledges that education is an informative predictor and contains an educa-
tion effect. Furthermore, equality of opportunity is not satisfied when marginal
estimates are used because all merit information is ignored. See Arneson (2015)
for a more detailed discussion.
4.6 Total Model
After analyzing the covariate groups in isolation, we now consider models with
sensitive, legitimate, and suspect variables. The data are assumed to have a joint
distribution P(Y, s,xo,xu,w), from which n observations are drawn. The relevant
DAGs are given in Figure 5. As before, the observed data and unrestricted full
data contain no conditional independence relationships. The fair data model cap-
tures the fairness assumption. Again consider a simple linear model for clarity.
Coefficients are given the subscript t and t has mean 0.
Total Model: Y = β0,t + β
>
s,ts+ β
>
x,txo + β
>
w,tw + t (11)
The now familiar decomposition into unique and shared components is more
complex because the shared components exist across multiple dimensions. Equa-
tion (12) separates each term into its unique component and the component which
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Fig 5: DAGs of Total Model
is correlated with the other variables.
Yˆ = βˆ0,t + H[Xo,W]S︸ ︷︷ ︸
di
βˆs,t + (I−H[Xo,W])S︸ ︷︷ ︸
dt
βˆs,t
+ H[S,W]Xo︸ ︷︷ ︸
sd+
βˆx,t + (I−H[S,W])Xo︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
βˆx,t
+H[Xo,S]W︸ ︷︷ ︸
sd−,sd+
βˆw,t + (I−H[Xo,S])W︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
βˆw,t (12)
The sensitive covariates are again separated into disparate impact and disparate
treatment components. Similarly, the legitimate covariates are separated into
permissible statistical discrimination and a unique component. The suspect co-
variates, however, display different behavior in the total model. The unique com-
ponent has the same interpretation, but the component correlated with other
covariates is labeled both sd+ and sd− to indicate that this combines both legal
and illegal forms of statistical discrimination. The notation, H[Xo,S]W, indicates
that the shared component is the best linear estimate of W given both S and
X. As w is a suspect variable, we need an impartial estimate of it. This is the
FEO model for impartial estimates as there are only sensitive and legitimate
covariates. In this case, w has taken the place of Y as the response.
Definition 6 (Impartial Estimate: Total Model). Impartial estimates are
created with the following multi-step procedure:
1. Estimate the total model (11) to produce βˆ0,t, βˆs,t, βˆx,t, and βˆw,t.
2. Create an impartial estimate of each element of w per Definition 4, and
collect the impartial estimates as Wˆ.
3. Set Yˆ = βˆ0,t +Xoβˆx,t + Wˆβˆw,t + (I−H[Xo,S])Wβˆw,t.
The conditions given for impartial estimates in Definition 2 merely specify the
properties of the residuals after creating estimates using Definition 6 under the
assumption that the full regression model holds. A more direct construction of
these estimates first pre-processes the suspect covariates w by projecting them
off of the sensitive covariates s. These adjusted covariates can then be treated as
legitimate variables because they are orthogonal to s. As noted previously, this
does not change the value of βˆw,t.
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4.7 Applications of Impartial Estimates
Now that impartial estimates have been provided, a simple comparison can
be made to identify the cost of disparate impact and governmental policies. The
cost of fairness in these cases can be quantified by considering the decisions
that would be made by different actors. Suppose that a privately owned, profit-
maximizing bank is providing loans. As such, the best estimates are those which
most accurately predict the riskiness of a loan while operating under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. Contrast this with a government-owned company that
is constrained to be impartial. This bank can constrain profit to achieve fairness
goals. Conceptually, the cost of the government policy is the difference in the
expected profit between the estimation methods these two banks would use.
The FEO models provide the minimally constrained impartial estimates. A
private bank may argue in favor of this method even if some covariates are prej-
udicial, because many covariates are generated outside the scope of the bank’s
operation. For example, discrimination in education may not be within the power
of the bank to change. The government-owned bank, however, may want to use
a partially or fully SEO model due to discrimination in the generation of some
covariates. The state-owned bank’s estimates are from the corresponding SEO
model. Using these estimates of risk, a bank would provide different loans at
different rates.
One could consider that loans are provided at rates determined by the state-
owned bank’s estimates but whose cost to the bank is computed using the privately-
owned bank’s estimates. The bank expects this to result in lower profit given its
estimates of risk. The difference in expected profit between this loan scheme and
the desired, profit-maximizing scheme is an estimate of the cost of the government
program. Said differently, it is the price that the government could pay the bank
for accomplishing the government’s goals. Examples of the different estimates can
be seen in our simplified data example in Table 1.
The cost of disparate impact can be estimated similarly. Instead of comparing
the ideal private bank and the state-owned bank, the comparison is between the
rates the bank actually provided and what the ideal private bank would have pro-
vided given the same data. Therefore, instead of comparing the SEO and FEO
models, one would compare the bank’s actual lending history to what would be
implied by the required impartial estimates. For example, suppose the bank fol-
lowed the current minimal legal prescription of excluding the sensitive covariates
as opposed to using impartial estimates. The difference between the actual and
impartial estimates are again seen in our simplified data example in Table 1. The
additional revenue the bank received due to their discriminatory lending practices
can be estimated as the difference in the two estimation methods. Elaboration of
these applications with real data is a subject of current research.
5. CORRECTING ESTIMATES
Suppose that we have estimates of credit risk, Y †, given by an unknown model
with unknown inputs. The model may use sensitive information to be intention-
ally or unintentionally discriminatory. This is a challenging but necessary case to
consider as most models used by private companies are proprietary. Therefore,
we must be completely agnostic as to the construction of these black-box esti-
mates. It is perhaps surprising that these estimates can easily be made impartial.
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Fig 6: Histogram of wine data rankings.
Consider Y † to be an additional explanatory covariate or covariates and include
them in the modeling similar to a stacked regression (Breiman, 1996):
Y = β0,c + β
>
s,cs+ β
>
x,cxo + β
>
w,cw + β
>
Y †Y
† + c.
These black-box estimates are potentially predictive, but there is no guarantee
that they are impartial. This identically matches the description of suspect co-
variates. If we treat Y † as a suspect covariate, its information can be used but
not in a way that makes distinctions between protected groups. This allows us to
easily correct black-box estimates.
A numeric example will solidify this idea and demonstrate the efficacy of our
methods. Our data contains rankings of wine quality and is taken from the UCI
Machine Learning Repository (Lichman, 2013). There are ratings for both red
and white wines and a reasonable request is that ranking be impartial between
the two groups. This data set captures all of the relevant issues that arise in
FADM and was also considered in Calders et al. (2013). It also demonstrates the
similarity between FADM and controlling for batch effects if data is aggregated
from multiple sources.
The response is the rating of wine quality measured between 0 and 10, the sen-
sitive feature is wine type (red or white), and there are 10 explanatory variables
such as acidity, sugar, and pH. Of the approximately 6,500 ratings, about 25%
are for red wines. The distributions of wine ratings are very similar, as seen in
Figure 6.
Calders and Verwer (2010) and Calders et al. (2013) claim that the appropriate
measure of unfairness in this case is given by the average rating difference be-
tween the two groups. This paper has argued that explainable differences need to
be taken into account. This is evidence for treating the multiple regression coeffi-
cient as an estimate of prejudice. We do not advocate doing so for reasons made
clear shortly, but the difference in measures is worth noting. The two measures
can disagree substantially, not only in magnitude but even in sign. The average
difference in wine rating is .24, with white wine being preferred; however, a mul-
tiple regression analysis indicates that white wine is, on average, rated .14 lower
than red wines, ceteris paribus. The difference in sign is an example of Simpson’s
Paradox and is more generally related to the problem of suppression (Johnson
et al., 2015).
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Estimating the extent of discrimination is a far more challenging problem than
providing fair estimates. It is akin to asking for an estimate of the average treat-
ment effect, where the treatment is wine type. It requires a set of causal assump-
tions to be made about the comparability of the two groups. In the language
of causal inference, there may be insufficient covariate overlap between the two
groups given the required differences between the two types of wine. This pre-
vents, or increases the difficulty in, accurately estimating a measure of discrim-
ination. Interested readers are directed toward Pearl (2009); Rosenbaum (2010)
for introductions to various perspectives on causal inference.
Our validation framework follows that of Calders et al. (2013). Models will be
trained on intentionally biased data and tested on the real data. Note that this
is not exactly the desired measure; ideally one should test on impartial data, but
this presupposes an answer to the problem at hand. By biasing the training data,
the test data is at least more impartial. Data is biased by randomly selecting 70%
of the white wines and increasing their rating by 1. This results in group mean
differences (white-red) of .94 on the biased data and .24 on the raw data.
This bias is picked up by the multiple regression coefficient on wine type
(WHITE). Averaged over 1,000 biased samples, the multiple regression coeffi-
cient for wine type increases by .7 on the biased data while all other coefficients
change by a negligible amount. Therefore, our impartial estimates are exactly
the same if produced using the biased data or raw data. This is precisely the
type of result necessary for impartial algorithms: the multiple regression model is
unaffected by the bias added to the data. Admittedly, this is trivial since the bias
is randomly attributed to 70% of white wines. That being said, this is heretofore
unrecognized in the literature and not acknowledged in Calders et al. (2013).
The hope is that the impartial estimates will improve performance on the test
sample even when they are trained on the biased data. We compare our models
with those of Calders et al. (2013), which are indicated by “Calders” in Ta-
bles 2 and 3. They attempt to capture explainable variability through the use
of propensity score stratification. This method estimates the probability that an
observation is a red or white wine. Observations are then binned into 5 groups
based on this propensity score. In each group, a full SEO model is fit where
all explanatory variables are considered discriminatory. Therefore, within each
strata, there is no average difference between groups. There is a large problem
with this perspective since there is often enough information to predict the sen-
sitive attribute almost perfectly. This results in largely homogeneous strata and
the method fails. Furthermore merely using 5 bins does not provide sufficient co-
variate overlap for the guarantees surrounding propensity score matching to hold,
even approximately. Other methods such as those of Kamiran et al. (2013) only
handle a single sensitive and single legitimate covariate. Our estimates satisfy all
of their fairness requirements in a more general and flexible framework.
The results we present are averaged over 20 simulations where out-of-sample
error is estimated using 5-fold cross-validation. Variability in the performance
estimates is negligible. Table 2 shows the linear regression results on this data.
As a baseline measure, we use ordinary least squares (OLS), which is merely the
estimates from the full regression model. This contains the disparate treatment
and disparate impact effects. The FEO model treats all non-sensitive explanatory
variables as legitimate, while the SEO model treats all non-sensitive covariates
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as proxy variables. There is a spectrum of SEO models that consider different
sets as fair or discriminatory. We chose to consider the full SEO model so as to
permit easy comparison to the Calders estimates.
Four performance measures are given using the out-of-sample estimates: RMSE
measured on the biased data (out-of-sample), RMSE on the raw data, the mean
difference in estimates between groups (DS), and our impartiality score (IS). Our
models have an impartiality score of 0 in-sample by construction, and Tables 2
and 3 demonstrate that this is not noticeably worsened out-of-sample. Note that
the impartiality score is measured with respect to the desired type of impartiality
(FEO or SEO). For the Calders estimates, SEO impartiality was used as it is
conceptually closest to their procedure. If FEO impartiality is used instead, the
IS is roughly half the value presented in the tables.
Table 2
Regression Performance
OLS Formal EO Sub. EO Calders
RMSE-biased 0.84 0.85 0.93 0.86
RMSE-raw 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.92
DS 0.94 0.60 0.00 0.79
IS 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.12
The general direction of performance results are as expected: requiring esti-
mates to be impartial worsens performance on the biased data but improves per-
formance on the test data. Even using linear regression models, we provide more
accurate estimates of the test data while minimizing the mean difference between
groups. This significantly improves upon the results of the Calders estimates.
From a different perspective, the results in Table 2 may not be particularly
impressive in that wine ratings are not well estimated; merely using the average
rating in the biased data to estimate the raw data yields an RMSE of 1.02.
This is to be expected, in part because wine quality is more complex than these
10 explanatory covariates, but also because rating is most likely not a linear
function of the explanatory covariates. Therefore, consider a more complex, black-
box estimate of rating that can account for these nonlinearities. We will use a
random forest (Breiman, 2001) as a canonical black-box, as it is an off-the-shelf
method which performs well in a variety of scenarios but has largely unknown
complexity. It is challenging to consider how s should be used constructively in a
random forest algorithm while ensuring impartiality. Furthermore, we allow the
random forest model to use s in order to demonstrate that estimates can be easily
corrected even when algorithms are trained on sensitive attributes.
Table 3 contains the results of the random forest models. The FEO model
treats the random forest estimates as potentially discriminatory but the others
as legitimate, while the SEO model considers all variables as potentially discrim-
inatory. These are again compared to the base-line random forest estimates and
the Calders estimates. The general trend is the same as before: constraining es-
timates to be impartial improves performance on the test sample but worsens
performance on the biased sample. Using a random forest significantly reduced
RMSE while not worsening the fairness measures. The corrected random forest
estimates significantly outperform the Calders estimates along all measures. It
does so even while exactly satisfying their desired constraint of zero mean differ-
ence between groups.
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Table 3
Corrected Random Forest Performance
RF Formal EO RF Sub. EO RF Calders
RMSE-biased 0.73 0.74 0.83 0.86
RMSE-raw 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.92
DS 0.93 0.62 0.00 0.79
IS 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.12
6. DISCUSSION
Our work has several important implications and contributions: we can con-
struct impartial estimates, ensure black-box estimates are impartial, and quan-
tify regulation and disparate impact. All of this is done through providing a clear
statistical theory of impartial estimation and explainable variability. While we
discuss the classical method of multiple regression, its power and interpretability
were heretofore not well-understood in the FADM literature. Future work moves
away from assumptions of linearity. Such methods would use a different similar-
ity metric to measure differences between people as well as a different functional
form of the response.
There are many open questions for FADM even in the linear setting, however.
For example, how should impartial inference be conducted? If estimates produced
by a proprietary model are close but not identical to our methods, can we test
their deviation from impartiality? This is crucially important in legal cases and
is closely related to inference under model-misspecification (Buja et al., 2014). A
second major challenge is to relax the assumption of known covariate groups. A
method to interpolate between the categories may remove some of the inherent
difficulties in the classification.
More generally, this paper provides a framework through which fairness and
impartial estimation can be understood broadly. There are two key components
that are required to generalize this approach to other methods. First, we identi-
fied the direct effect of xo by estimating the regression model using all available
information. This is required for the coefficient estimates in both the formal and
substantive equality of opportunity models. Second, variables were residualized
to remove the direct effect of s from w. This was necessary for the substantive
equality of opportunity models and to correct black-box estimates. Both gener-
alized linear models and generalized additive models can perform these tasks.
Therefore, the concepts outlined here are applicable in those domains. A more
thorough investigation of these settings is currently being conducted.
7. APPENDIX
Our definition of impartial estimates follows easily from their construction in
Section 4. The derivation of suitable conditions is only presented for the total
model case as the others follow as special cases. As such, model subscripts are
removed from the coefficient notation. Furthermore, we drop the notation for
observed and unobserved legitimate covariates as only observed covariates are
present in the estimated functions. Consider the population regression of Y on s,
x, and w:
Y = β0 + β
>
s s+ β
>
x x+ β
>
ww + .
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Regardless of the true functional form of Y , the residual  always satisfies E[u] =
0, Cov(s, ) = 0, Cov(x, ) = 0, and Cov(w, ) = 0 (where in each case 0 is
a vector of zeros of the appropriate dimension). The conditions in Definition 2
specify the properties of the residual when Yˆ is an impartial estimate constructed
via Definition 6.
Our estimate is given as
Yˆ = βˆ>0 + βˆ
>
x x+ βˆ
>
w(w − Λˆ>s s),
where Λˆs is the matrix of coefficients from estimating
w = λ0 + Λ
>
s s+ Λ
>
xx+ w.
Therefore, the impartial residual is
u = (βs + Λsβw)
>s+ .
The first three properties of Definition 2 follow from simple computations after
noting that
Cov(u, s) = (βs + Λsβs)
>Var(s)⇒ (βs + Λsβs)> = Cov(u, s)Var(s)−1,
assuming the inverse exists.
The last property, Cor(η, s) = 0 where η = Yˆ − L(Yˆ |x), is definitional, and
specifies the difference between legitimate and suspect covariates. Since suspect
covariates are projected off of s initially, the only relationship between Yˆ and s
must be due solely to linear functions of x. This condition by itself is insufficient
to define impartial estimates because of the possibility of redlining.
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